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13 July 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Associate Director of Central
Intelligence for Military Support

FROM: Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

SUBJECT: Principals' Committee Meeting on Bosnia,
14 July 1995

1. We have not yet received an agenda for Friday's Principals' Committee meeting on Bosnia. Indeed, when I called Sandy Vershbow at about 1800 EDT, he told me that they had not yet had a chance to work on the agenda.

- You probably will be called on to provide a situation update. The situation on the ground is fluid, so the Task Force will provide you with current talking points at some point before the meeting. In the meantime, the INTELLIGENCE UPDATE TAB of this book includes the two situation reports published today.
- The latest information is that the Serbs have largely concluded the evacuation of Muslim refugees from Srebrenica. There is some fighting around Zepa, but no clear evidence of an attack underway to overrun the enclave. The SERB OBJECTIVES TAB offers some thoughts on what the Serbs might do next.

2. I recommend if the opportunity arises that you warn the Principals not to forget about Croatia. Zagreb may well use this time when international attention is diverted by Bosnia to launch an attack against the Krajina Serbs.

- Intelligence information indicates that Croatian forces continue to jockey around Sector South.

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3. According to Vershbow, French President Chirac called President Clinton this afternoon and presented him with an either-or proposition: Either send US ground troops to join the UK and France in forcibly reestablishing the Srebrenica enclave and conducting a more robust defense of the UNPROFOR mission, or the French will withdraw. Vershbow reports that Shali called his French counterpart, Lanxade, who thought that Chirac's proposal was ludicrous. Needless to say, the Principals will need to respond to Chirac's overture. [redacted]

4. Principals probably will discuss the issue of whether a "firebreak" can be created to save Gorazde and Sarajevo after Srebrenica and Zepa have been surrendered. The GORAZDE TAB includes our assessment that that enclave is more defensible than Srebrenica and Zepa, including details on the balance of forces. Some--such as Walt Slocombe--have been arguing that loss of the enclaves, including Gorazde, would allow UNPROFOR to establish a more defensible and credible presence in the core area of Bosnia, and maybe facilitate a negotiated settlement by removing the enclaves as a contentious issue. State Department, on the otherhand, is appalled at the notion of giving up the enclaves, believing this would undercut the Contact Group map and lead to the inevitable fall of Sarajevo.

- Our analysis is closer to Slocombe's. Loss of Gorazde in no way implies that Sarajevo is also lost. Sarajevo is much more defensible than Gorazde. [redacted]

5. I will be on leave Friday, but Ray Converse will provide you with any support--including a pre-brief--that you may need for the meeting. [redacted]

A. Norman Schindler

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